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Abstract. Fuzzy extractors are a powerful tool to extract randomness from noisy data. A fuzzy extractor can extract
randomness only if the source data is discrete while in practice source data is continuous. Using quantizers to
transform continuous data into discrete data is a commonly used solution. However, as far as we know no study has
been made of the effect of the quantization strategy on the performance of fuzzy extractors. We use an unexplored
parallel between watermarking theory and fuzzy extractors to study the effects of quantization. We construct the
encoder and the decoder function of a fuzzy extractor using quantization index modulation (QIM) and we express
performance properties of a fuzzy extractor in terms of geometric properties of the used QIM. In the end we present
and analyze, as an exercise, two constructions in the two dimensional space. Our 6-hexagonal tiling construction
offers ( log2 6
2
− 1) ≈ 0.3 extra bits per dimension of the space compared to the known square quantization based
fuzzy extractor. The other construction turns out to be optimal from resilience to noise perspective.
1 Introduction
approximately Fuzzy extractors allow cryptographic keys to be generated from noisy, non-uniform biometric data.
They can be used to authenticate a user to a server without storing her biometric data directly. This is important
because the server may well be (partially) untrusted. By using a fuzzy extractor, the user can even use different
cryptographic keys for different purposes, while using the same biometric. A fuzzy extractor can extract random-
ness only if the source data is discrete while in practice source data is continuous. Using quantizers to transform
continuous data into discrete data is a commonly used solution. However, as far as we know no study has been
made of the effect of the quantization strategy on the performance of fuzzy extractors. In this paper we make the
first attempt to solve this problem by using results from watermarking theory. We build our results on an unex-
plored parallel existing between these two domains. In the following we describe the characteristics of both fields
and how techniques from watermarking can be used in fuzzy extractor construction. Our results are threefold: (1)
We use the efficient QIM construction from the watermarking literature to make the fuzzy extractor model handle
continuous data directly. This is an important problem since most biometric data is represented in continuous form.
Our approach is intuitive because it allows modelling the properties of a cs-fuzzy extractor in terms of properties of
the QIM. Our construction allows for any type of continuous data regardless of the associated distribution. (2) We
look at quantization strategies for high dimensional data and we argue that quantization in a two-dimensional space
is optimal for the length of the encoded key. (3) To illustrate our point, we give two practical constructions in two
dimensional space, one being optimal from the robustness vs entropy loss point of view and the other optimal from
the key length vs entropy loss perspective.
Fuzzy extractors. A fuzzy extractor, as depicted in Figure 1 (B), is a pair of two functions. The first function is
called encoder, and is used once when the user generates a key for use on the untrusted server. The second function
is the decoder, which is used to authenticate the user to the server. The encoder takes as input the average distribu-
tion U of the used biometric, the users biometric X and the secret key K to be embedded. It then outputs a public
sketch P . The encoder computes P in such a way that no significant information is revealed about either the secret
key or the biometric. The server will store the pair 〈P, f(K)〉, where f(K) can for instance be a hash of the key
used for authentication. The decoder takes as input a fresh measurement X ′ of the users biometric and the public
sketch P , and outputs the secret key K if X and X ′ are similar enough. The similarity measure used is specific to
the type of biometric and the algorithm used. The server can then verify that f(K) matches the stored information.
In the literature, fuzzy extractors are mostly used for biometric data represent as n point discrete vector, X =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn). However, when biometrics originate in a continuous domain (i.eX is not a collection of discrete
points, but is a probability density function that describes the behavior of the each Xi) the general approach is a
three step procedure applied on each vector element separately:
1. Quantize the continuous data. A quantizer will transform the points into a suitable, discrete form of data, as is
assumed in the fuzzy extractor model.
2. Apply error correcting techniques. No two biometric measurements are exactly the same, even when collected
from the same person in two consecutive measurements. This step is used to compensate for the expected noise.
3. Apply a randomness extractor. Biometric data is not uniformly distributed and this step extracts uniformly
random bits from the biometric data.
Three parameters are important for a fuzzy extractor construction. The robustness represents the amount of noise
tolerated between two measurements X and X ′ such that K is computed by the decoder without mistake. In this
paper we assume the white noise model and we consider that only realizations of Xi can be perturbed by noise.
Key length represents the length of K in bits and entropy loss as defined in [6] measures the advantage that P
gives to an adversary in guessing K. We wish to design fuzzy extractor constructions that allow a long key, have
high robustness and high security (i.e. low entropy loss). In each of the steps in the general approach one of these
parameters is considered. After step 1, we have an entropy measure, in step 2 we set the robustness parameter and
in step three we have the length of the key K. The entropy loss can only be calculated after all steps are taken as an
end result.
Research Questions. While steps 2 and 3 in the general approach are well understood very little is known about
the effect of the choice of quantization strategy. Our first research question is: ”is it possible to derive a construction
such that when the quantization method is chosen we know beforehand what the effects on robustness, key length
and entropy loss are?” This is an important problem since most biometric data originate in the continuous domain
and fuzzy extractors is a good method to construct keys from biometric data. If we can answer the above question,
the next question is even more interesting. Assuming we understand how the quantization strategy influence the per-
formance of a fuzzy extractor, how should one quantize the high dimensional X? Quantize each feature separately
as it is done now, or maybe grouping multiple features at a time and performing quantization in higher dimensional
space. Our second research question is: ”what is an optimal quantization strategy?” In this paper we try to answer
both of the above question. To introduce our approach in answering these two questions we first note that efficient
quantization of continuous data is not a new problem, and has been studied in the area of watermarking. Moreover
the efficiency measures of watermarking refer to the same parameters as the one of interest for our problem: error
correction and randomness extraction.
Watermarking. This topic has been extensively studied in the field of watermarking. At first glance, watermark-
ing and fuzzy extractors seem to be two distinct and unrelated areas. Digital watermarking or simply watermarking
is a process in which a signal is hidden or embedded into another signal, like a photograph, a music file or a video
file. A simple example of a digital watermark would be a message laid over a video that contains copyright infor-
mation. However, there might be other invisible information, that identifies the purchaser of the video file. In case
the video file is distributed illegally, the invisible watermark helps in identifying the culprit. We argue that although
the intended application is different, there is a strong resemblance between a continuous source fuzzy extractor and
a watermarking scheme.
The first similarity is the intrinsic machinery of the encoding and decoding function, shown in Figure 1 (A). During
watermark encoding, the message m, containing the purchaser identity, is embedded into the video file S using a
secret key K. The result Sm of the encoding, the video file containing the purchaser identity, is made public. It
should be possible during decoding to recover the encoded message m from the distributed file Sm even if noise
has been added to it, provided the secret key K is available. However, without the secret key K it should be hard to
alter or even detect the message m hidden in Sm. Depending on the application, the choice for a particular encoder
and decoder function depends on a number of practical considerations, for example whether the decoder has full,
partial or no knowledge of the initial signal S. For our purpose these details are of little interest. We note in Figure 1
that for both watermarking and fuzzy extractor the encoder and the decoder take similar input parameters and output
the same type of information.
However, there is a crucial difference: while watermarking aims to hide a message in the signal and then publishes
the modified signal, in this analogy a fuzzy extractor aims to “hide“ the signal as well and only publishes the dif-
ference vector between the modified signal and the original (which is measured at reconstruction). There is another
important difference: the secret in the watermarking scheme is K while for a fuzzy extractor the ”key” is the bio-
metric template X . In this view, while in the watermark the noise is added to the published data Sm, in a fuzzy
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Fig. 1. (A) Digital Watermarking; (B) Fuzzy extractor;
extractor the noise is added to the key.
There is a second similarity in the fact that both fuzzy extractors and watermarking use similar performance mea-
sures. The performance of a watermarking scheme is evaluated in terms as embedding rate, robustness and distor-
tion [4] also referred to as perceptual transparency. Informally speaking, embedding rate refers to the maximum
number of bits that can be used for the message m when embedded into the video file S, and robustness refers
to the amount of noise that can be tolerated such that the message m can still be decoded correctly. Distortion
quantifies the perceptual difference between the initial file S and the watermarked version Sm. Typically design-
ers of watermarking schemes seek to achieve high embedding rate, thus long messages, and high robustness while
inducing low levels of distortion. We notice that in both watermarking and fuzzy extractors robustness measures
the tolerated noise, the key length and embedding rate in fact both refer to the quantity of information (in bits) that
can be output by the decoder function. In both domains we wish to achieve high robustness and a high amount
of embedded information. The third measure namely distortion and entropy loss are both security measures that
reflect the intended application scenario. Entropy loss measures the advantage of an attacker in guessing the secret
K when the biometric X is not known. Distortion measures how easy is to detect or to modify the message m in
the public file Sm when the secret key K is not known.
Our Contribution. Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) [5], are a class of digital watermarking methods that
can achieve efficient trade-offs among the amount of embedded information rate, robustness and distortion. We use
QIM to realize a practical fuzzy extractor construction for continuous data which we termed QIM-fuzzy extractor.
Roughly speaking, the idea is to define a set of quantizers for the continuous input data X . The encoder will choose
one of the quantizers based on the secret K and use that quantizer to output the public string P , eliminating some
information as needed. The quantizer output provides error correction because a small deviation of X is likely to
result in the same quantized value. However, since a different choice of quantizer is likely to produce a different
output P , the decoder can use the published value of P and his own approximation for P to figure out the most
likely choice for the secret K. The QIM-fuzzy extractor is similar to the discrete version in the literature since to
encode the secret K, a codepoint C is chosen and the output is calculated as P = X − C. An X ′ close to X
can decode C, because C′ = P + X ′ = C − (X − X ′) and the code handles the correction of C′. We link the
geometric properties of QIM to the performance measures so that when choosing a quantization strategy we can
estimate beforehand the robustness, key length and entropy loss measured.
The QIM-fuzzy extractor construction above represents the answer to research question number one. Remember
that X is an n-point vector where each element is represented as continuous. So far we know how to transform
continuous into discrete data one vector element at a time. Is this the best approach? Until now, this problem can-
not be studied because the basic tools to model could not be represented. We believe this problem to be important
because all biometric data is high dimensional data. We use the QIM-fuzzy extractor construction to model the opti-
mal high-dimensional quantization problem as a more intuitive dual sphere packing-sphere covering problem. The
sphere packing problem is concerned with arrangements of non-overlapping identical spheres in the densest(most-
efficient) way. Usually the space involved is the three-dimensional Euclidian space. However, this problem can
be generalized to any n-dimensional space (where hyperspheres are stacked). This is a hard mathematical prob-
lem where exact solutions are only known for a few dimensions. The sphere covering problem asks for the least
dense way to cover the n-dimensional space with equal overlapping spheres. We prove that quantization in the two-
dimensional space is optimal from the key length point of view, compared to quantization in any other dimension.
We propose a practical QIM-fuzzy extractor construction which achieves optimal robustness, a long key and low
entropy-loss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related works in the area of fuzzy extractors and water-
marking in section 2. Notation, fundamentals of quantization in continuous domain and the existing definition of
fuzzy extractor for discrete data can be found in section 3. We give our cs-fuzzy extractor construction in terms of a
QIM and and link performance of fuzzy extractors to geometric properties of quantizers in section 4. Optimization
of performance trade-off is studied in 4.2. We give two practical constructions for the quantization based cs-fuzzy
extractor in section 5 and we compare the properties of these construction with the existing square lattice packing
in section 5.3.
2 Related work
Our work combines results from the area of data hiding, mathematics, signal processing and randomness extraction
from noisy data.
Reproducible randomness is the main ingredient of a good cryptographic system. Good quality uniform random
sources are rare compared to the more common non-uniform sources. Biometric data is easily accessible, high
entropy data. However it is not uniformly distributed and its randomness cannot be exactly reproduced. Depending
on the source properties several constructions were proposed. Dodis et al [6] consider discrete distributed noise and
propose fuzzy extractors and secure sketches for different error models. These models are not directly applicable to
continuously distributed sources. Linnartz et al. [11] construct shielding functions for continuously distributed data
and propose a practical construction which can be considered a one-dimensional QIM. The same approach is taken
by Li et al [10] who propose quantization functions for extending the scope of secure sketches to continuously
distributed data. Buhan et al [2] analyze the achievable performances of such constructions given the quality of
the source in terms of false acceptance rate and false rejection rate, the main measures on the performance of a
biometric system.
The process of transforming a continuous distribution to a discrete distribution influences the performance of fuzzy
extractors and secure sketches. Quantization is the process of replacing analog samples with approximate values
taken from a finite set of allowed values. The basic theory of one-dimensional quantization is reviewed by Ger-
sho [7]. The same author investigates [8] the influences of high dimensional quantization on the performance of
digital coding for analogue sources. QIM constructions are used by Chen and Wornell [4] in the context of water-
marking. The same authors introduce dithered quantizers [3]. Moulin and Koetter [12] give an excellent overview
of QIM in the general context of data hiding. Barron et al [1] develop a geometric interpretation of conflicting
requirements between information embedding and source coding with side information.
3 Fundamentals
Notation. From now on with capital letters we denote random variables, with small letters we denote realizations
of random variables, calligraphic letters are reserved for sets and greek letters are used to describe properties.
Let U be a n-dimensional continuous space endowed with a metric d and with background distribution PU . Let
X be a n-dimensional distribution on U with joint density PX = p(X1, X2, . . . Xn). For optimal encoding-
decoding performance during encoding we use the best representative of distribution associated to X , for example
the estimated mean when PX is a multivariate Gaussian distribution. However, to keep things simple we abuse
notation and we use X where we mean the best representative of the distribution PX . Let K be a set of keys, and
|K| = l. By PK we denote the uniform distribution on K.
The min-entropy or the predictability of a variable A is defined as:H∞(A) = − log2(maxa P (A = a)). The min-
entropy represents the number of nearly uniform bits that can be extracted from the variable A. For two possibly cor-
related random variablesA andB the average min-entropy is defined as H˜∞(A|B) = − log(Eb←B [2−H∞(A|B=b)]),
which represents the remaining uncertainty about A given B.
For a discrete random variable A the entropy loss when publishing the correlated variable B is defined as H∞(A)−
H˜∞(A|B). It is known [6] that if B is an t bit string we have: H˜∞(A|B) ≥ H∞(A)− t.
Quantization. To warm up we start with an example of how a QIM construction can be used for data hiding and
we then formalize this approach.
Example. Lets assume we want to embed k ∈ {0, 1}, thus one bit of information, into X . For this purpose we
construct a set of quantizers QIM = {Q◦, Q×}, see Figure 2. The embedding is done by mapping the points of U to
the elements of these two quantizers. For example if k = 1 we map X to the closest× point. The set of all× points
form the quantizer Q×. If k = 0 we map X to the closest ◦ point. When decoding, after the data X is perturbed
by noise, the decoder will decode the received data to the closest × or ◦ point, and output 1 if that closest point is
a × and 0 otherwise. That is the reason why the × and ◦ points are called reconstruction points. The Voronoi cells
around these points are called decision regions.
mind
Fig. 2. QIM vector quantizer that can encode 1 bit of information.
The amount of tolerated noise or the robustness is determined by δmin, the minimum distance between two distinct
neighboring points. The filled cell in Figure 2 is called Voronoi cell and has the property that all its points are closer
to its center than to any other center. The size and shape of the Voronoi cell determines the embedded induced dis-
tortion when QIM are used for watermarking. By setting the number of quantizers in the QIM set and by choosing
the shape and size of the decision region the performance properties can be fine tuned.
Formalization. A quantizer is a function Q : U → C that maps each point in U into one of the reconstruction points
in a set C = {c1, c2, . . .} where each ci ∈ U as follows: Q(x) = c where d(x, c) = minci∈C d(x, ci). Every
reconstruction point ci is situated in a decision region Ωi(ci). It is a common practise to make the reconstruction
point the centroid of the decision region, since this minimizes the quantization error. The union of all decision re-
gions Ω =
S
ci∈C Ωi(ci) creates a tiling of the space.
A QIM : U ×K → CQIM is a set of quantizers {Q1, Q2, . . . QN}, that maps x ∈ U , the realization of X , into one
of the reconstruction points of the quantizers in the set. The quantizer is chosen by the input value k ∈ K such that
QIM(x, k) = Qk(x). The set of all reconstruction points is CQIM =
S
k∈K Ck where Ck is the set of reconstruction
points of quantizer Qk.
A dithered quantizer is a special type of QIM for which all decision regions of all quantizers are congruent poly-
topes (generalization of a polygon to higher dimensions). Each quantizer in the ensemble can be obtained by shifting
the reconstruction points of any other quantizer in the ensemble. The shifts correspond to dither vectors. The num-
ber of dither vectors is equal to the number of quantizers in the ensemble.
We define the minimum distance δmin of a QIM, as the minimum distance between reconstructions points of all
quantizers in it:
δmin = min
k,p∈K
min
i∈Ck,j∈Cp
||cik − cjp||,
so spheres with radius δmin
2
and centers in CQIM are disjoint. Let ζk be the smallest radius circle such that circles
centered in the centroids of quantizer Qk with radius ζk cover the universe U . We define the covering distance
λmax as:
λmax = max
k∈K
ζk,
so spheres with radius λmax and centers in Ci cover the universe U .
Fuzzy extractors for discrete U . For modelling the process of randomness extraction from noisy data, Dodis
et al. [6] define the notion of a fuzzy extractor. Enrollment is performed by a function Enc, which on input of the
noise free biometric X and the binary string k, will compute a public string P . The binary string k can be extracted
from the biometric data itself [13] or can be generated independently [11]. During authentication, the function Dec
takes as input a noisy measurement X ′ and the public P and it will output the binary string K if X and X ′ are
close enough. For a discrete source U , Dodis et al [6] define a fuzzy extractor as follows:
Definition 1 (Fuzzy extractor). A (U ,m, l, t, ²) fuzzy extractor is a pair of randomized procedures { Enc,Dec},
with the following properties:
1. Enc on input w ∈ U extracts a private string k∈ {0, 1}l and a public string p.
2. Dec is a decoding function that given a word w′ ∈ U and a public string p outputs a string k ∈ {0, 1}l, such
that for any words w,w′ ∈ U satisfying d(w,w′) ≤ t and the pair 〈k,p〉 ← Enc(w) generated by the encoder,
it holds that k = Dec(w′, p).
3. For any distribution X on U , such that H∞[X] ≥ m, the string k is nearly uniform even for those who observe
p: if 〈k, p〉 ← Enc(x), it holds that SD[〈k,p〉, 〈K, p〉] ≤ ² (here K is the uniform distribution on K.
4 Constructing cs-fuzzy extractor using a QIM
In this section we propose a general approach to extract cryptographic keys from noisy, continuous data. We consider
points in an n-dimensional universe U , i.e. U ⊂ <n. We make the assumption that the random binary string K is
not extracted from the random variable X , but could also be generated independently.
Definition 2 (cs-Fuzzy Extractors). A cs-fuzzy extractor scheme is a tuple (U ,K,P,Enc,Dec), where Enc :
U × K → P is an encoder and Dec : U × P → K is a decoder.
We say the scheme is ρ-reliable for the distribution X on U if
P (Dec(x,Enc(X, k)) = k|X = x) ≥ ρ,
for all k ∈ K. We say the scheme is ²-secure if for any X we have that
H∞(K)− H˜∞(K|Enc(X, k)) ≤ ²,
for all k ∈ K.
In this way, the definition captures both the robustness and the security we require. Since security could be defined
in terms of entropy loss on the key, as well as entropy loss on the biometric X , our choice warrants some expla-
nation. As multiple points x ∈ U can give rise to the same key on decoding, we have that H∞(X|Enc(X, k)) ≥
H∞(K|Enc(X, k)). In other words, the entropy loss is higher on the key then on the biometric. This, coupled with
the fact that the initial entropy is also likely to be lower, makes the entropy loss on the key the most restrictive
of the two. A final reason for this choice lies in the application: while the biometric itself is not really secret (one
leaves fingerprints all over the place, and having to present the biometric gives the real security), the protection of
the key is paramount - if an attacker learns about the key, she could potentially circumvent the biometric altogether.
As discussed in the previous section, we construct a cs-fuzzy extractor using a QIM. Our construction works as
follows:
Definition 3 (QIM-Fuzzy Extractor). A QIM-Fuzzy Extractor is a cs-fuzzy extractor where the encoder and de-
coder are defined as
Enc(x, k) = QIM(x, k)− x,
and Dec is the minimum distance Euclidian decoder:
Dec(x′, p) = eQ(x′ + p),
where eQ : U → K, eQ(x′) = k if d(x′, Ck) = min
k∈K
d(x′, Ck).
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Fig. 4. Decoding with a QIM
Intuitively, our construction, is a generalization of the scheme of Linnartz and Tuyls [11]. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate
the encoding respectively the decoding functions for a QIM ensemble of three quantizers {Qo, Q+, Q?}. During
encoding the secret k ∈ {o, ?,+} selects a quantizer, say Qo. The selected quantizer finds the centroid Qo(x)
closest to x and the encoder returns the difference between the two as p, with |p| ≤ λmax. Decoding p and x′
should return o if x′ is drawn from PX , however this happens only if x′ + p is close to Qo(x) or in other words if
x′+ p is in the decision region of the chosen centroid (gray area in figure 4). Errors occur if (x′+ p) /∈ Ω(Qo(x)),
thus the size of Ω(Qo(x)) parametrized by δmin determines the probability of errors.
4.1 Performance criteria for cs-fuzzy extractor
In the following we express the properties of a cs-fuzzy extractor in terms of the used quantizers. All proofs in the
following lemmas represent are our own results.
Key Length. The key length of a cs-fuzzy extractor represents the number of bits that can be outputted by the
decoder, thus |K| = l when X is an n-dimensional vector. Without reducing the generality we may assume that
in each dimension the same number of bits can be encoded, thus l
n
bits. Due to the construction of our QIM-fuzzy
extractor it means that the set of quantizers must have a number of at least 2d
l
n
e elements.
Depending on the method of quantization and the background distribution PU , the a-posteriori randomness in K
can change. This remark is rather subtle. During encoding each k is drawn uniformly at random from K. However,
when the decoder function is published some key values may become more probable then others if PU is not
uniform. H∞(K) measures the randomness remaining in K given the decoder function is made public.
Robustness. In the following lemma, we link robustness of a cs-fuzzy extractor to the size and shape of the
decision regions.
Lemma 1 (Bounds on ρ). The robustness of a QIM-Fuzzy Extractor for any random X ∈ U with joint density
function Px and any secret k ∈ K can be bounded as follows:
ρ ≤
Z
S
i Ω(c
i
k
)
Px(y − Enc(X, k))dy
ρ ≥
Z
B(X,
δmin
2 )
Px(x)dx,
where B(x, r) is the sphere centered in x with radius r.
Proof : We can write the first relation as:
P (Dec(x′,Enc(x, k)) = k) =
X
i∈I
Z
Ω(cim)
P (x)dx
where x′ ∈ X. We have that (∀k ∈ K):
ρ ≤
X
i∈I
Z
Ω(cim)P (x)dx
We have equality when probability associated to the sum of all decision regions of all quantizers is equal. In other
words if probability associated to all codewords is equal.
The second relation is straightforward. Robustness is at least the sum of all balls of radius δmin
2
inscribed in the
decision regions. Thus the size of this ball determines the robustness to noise. The shape of the decision region that
inscribes the ball is important as well.
Security. We start this paragraph with three observations. The first one, is that biometric information is not secret.
We leave our fingerprints everywhere and anyone can take our picture without us noticing. The security of biometric
authentication lies in the ability to reproduce a particular biometrical characteristic at request. The second one, is
that if an attacker learns about the secret key k, she could potentially circumvent security altogether. The third one,
is that from our construction if the attacker cannot decide on the correct value of k it is much harder for her to
decide on the correct value of X . The last observation requires a somewhat more elaborate explanation.
In the decoder function example presented in Figure 4, the attacker can choose between three different key values{◦,+, ∗}.
Lets assume he manages to guess the correct one, in our example ◦. For the attacker to guess the correct value of
the biometric she has to decide which of reconstruction points of quantizer Q◦, denoted with C◦ was closest to the
value of x. Without any other information this is an impossible task since the cardinal of the set C◦ is infinite. As a
result it is trivial to prove that:
H∞(QIM(X,K)) ≤ H∞(K)
It was proven by Buhan et al., [2] that the min-entropy of key H∞(K) can not be arbitrarily large and depends
mostly on the quality of the biometric data available. Also it was proven by Dodis et al., [6] that the entropy loss
when publishing the sketch p is upper bounded by the size (in bits) of public sketch. Our QIM-fuzzy extractor
construction proves useful since we have that |p| ≤ λmax.
4.2 Optimizing cs-fuzzy extractor
In this section, we will closely analyze the key length allowed by the restrictions we placed on the encoding and
encoding functions by our performance criteria.
Firstly, we’ll take a look at the decoder, which ties in directly with the robustness to noise. The minimum size an er-
ror has to be in order to produce a wrong decoding is δmin
2
. Thus, the collection of spheres with that radius, centered
in each reconstruction point of all quantizers should be disjoint. Secondly, the encoder has to be able to encode an
arbitrary point in U to any key. Hence, for each key the collection of spheres centered in each reconstruction points
of that key with radius λmax should cover the entire space U . We want to minimize λmax, which is the size of the
helper data, to avoid unnecessary entropy loss.
These two radii can be linked as follows:
Lemma 2. The covering distance of a QIM ensemble, defined as above is lower bounded by:
λmax ≥ n
√
N
δmin
2
where n represents the dimension of the space and N is the number of different quantizers.
Proof : As noted above, all spheres with radius δmin
2
centered in the centroids of the whole ensemble are disjoint.
Each collection of spheres with radius λmax centered in the centroids of an individual quantizer gives a covering
of the space U . Therefore, a sphere with radius λmax, regardless of its center, contains at least the volume of N
disjoint spheres of radius δmin/2, one for each quantizer in the ensemble. Comparing the volumes, we have that
snλ
n
max ≥ snN(δmin
2
)n
where sn is a constant only depending on the dimension.
While a dithered quantizer will achieve equiprobable keys if the distribution on U is uniform, in practice this
assumption does not hold. It is more reasonable to assume that the distribution is spherically symmetrical, or in
other words that measurement errors only depend on the distance, and not on the direction. Thus, in order to achieve
equiprobable keys, the reconstruction points must be equidistant. This leads us to consider the kissing number τ(n),
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Fig. 6. Decoding of 6-hexagonal tiling
which is defined to be the maximum number of white n-dimensional spheres touching a black sphere. For most
dimensions, only bounds on the kissing number are known.
Assuming a spherically symmetric background distribution (which is weaker then the often made gaussian assump-
tion), there is only so much different equiprobable keys one can achieve:
Theorem 1 (Optimal high dimensional packing.). Assume the background distribution to be spherically sym-
metrical. If one wants to achieve equiprobable keys given this distribution, the number of keys in a n-dimensional
QIM is upper bounded by the kissing number τ(n).
Proof sketch:
If we want to achieve a maximum number of equiprobable keys (without sacrificing too much robustness, the
best construction is to center the distribution in one sphere, and give each touching sphere a different key. Note
that disregarding this “first” ring of spheres doesn’t help to embed more bits in general, since there generally are
multiple distances with only τ(n) different spheres at that distance.
Combined with known bounds on the kissing number [9,14], we arrive at the following somewhat surprising con-
clusion:
Corrolary 1 Assuming a spherically symmetrical distribution on U and equiprobable keys, for a
(U ,K,P,Enc,Dec,QIM) the most equiprobable keys are attained by quantizing two dimensions at a time, leading
to
N(n) = 6b
n
2 c2(n−2b
n
2 c)
different keys.
Proof : Known upper bounds on the kissing number in n dimensions [9] state τ(n) ≤ 20.401n(1+o(1)). This means
that N(n) ≥ τ(n) in all dimensions, since N(n) ≈ 21.3n and small dimensions can easily be verified by hand.
Also note that N(n1 + n2) ≤ N(n1)N(n2). Thus quantizing dimensions pairwise gives the biggest number of
equiprobable keys for any spherically symmetric distribution.
5 Practical constructions
In this section we present two constructions for cs-fuzzy extractors in two dimensional space using a dithered QIM.
We choose a hexagonal lattice to represent reconstruction points for the QIM, since this gives both a smallest circle
covering (for the encoder) and a densest circle packing (for the decoder).
The first construction named 7-hexagonal tiling, achieves a key length of n × log2 7
2
bits, where n is the dimen-
sionality of the space X is drawn from. The scheme is optimal from the robustness point of view. However, in
this construction keys are not equiprobable if the distribution is not flat enough. The second construction named 6-
hexagonal tiling, fixes this problem, achieving a slightly lower key length of n× log2 6
2
bits. In our construction the
reconstruction points of all quantizers are shifted versions of some base quantizer Q0. A dither vector −→vk is defined
for each possible k ∈ K. We define the tiling polytope as the repeated structure in the space that is obtained by
decoding to the closest reconstruction points. It follows from the definition that the tiling polytope contains exactly
one decision region of each quantizers in the ensemble. In Figures 5 and 6 the tiling polytopes are delimited by the
red line.
5.1 7-Hexagonal Tiling
The n-dimensional space U is partitioned in n
2
-two dimensional subspaces PU1U2 . Each subspace is considered
separately. On the x-axes in Figure 5 we have the values for U1 and on the y-axes we have the values of U2. Along
the z-axes (not shown in the figure) we have the probability density associated to both features PU1U2 . We start
our construction by choosing the densest circle packing existing in two dimensional space which is the hexagonal
packing. All circles have equal radius and the center of the circle is the reconstruction point. To each reconstruction
point a key value is associated. However the circles do not tile the space. As a result when x the realization of
X falls into the non-covered region, it cannot be associated to any reconstruction point. We need to approximate
the circle with some polygons that tile the two-dimensional space. In two dimensions there are only three such
polygons: triangles, squares and hexagons. Since we assume a spherical symmetrical distribution for PU1U2 the
hexagon is the best approximations for the circle from robustness point of view.
The next step is to associate key values to our hexagons such that for any value of (X1, X2), the user biometric,
any key label is at most at the given distance (sphere covering problem.) Thus our first construction is a dithered
QIM defined as an ensemble of 7 quantizers. The reconstruction points of the base quantizer, Q0 are defined by the
lattice spanned by the vectors
−→
B1 = (5,
√
3)q,
−→
B2 = (4,−2
√
3)q, where q is the scaling factor of the lattice.
In figure 5 these points are labelled k0.
The other reconstruction points of quantizers Qi, i = 1, . . . , 6 are obtained by shifting the base quantizer with the
dither vectors {−→v1 , · · · ,−→v6} such thatQi(x) = Q0(−→x +−→vi ). The values for these dithered vectors are:−→v1 = (2, 0),−→v2 = (−3,
√
3), −→v3 = (−1,−
√
3), −→v4 = (−2, 0), −→v5 = (3,−
√
3) and −→v6 = (1,
√
3). Encoding and decoding
works as in our construction. The decoder function is shown graphically in figure 5.
5.2 6-Hexagonal Tiling
Assume that the PU1U2 is a spherical symmetrical distribution with mean centered in the axes origin. The hexagon
centered in the origin of the axes will usually have associated a higher probability then the off-center hexagons.
This effect grows as we increase the scaling factor q of the lattice. This construction eliminates the middle hexagon,
to make all keys equiprobable (see Theorem 1). The key length is log2 6
2
bits. The tiling polytope is formed by 6
decision regions and thus there are only 6 dither vectors, see figure 6. The same dither vectors, {−→v1 , · · · ,−→v6} are
used to construct the quantizers, but the basic quantizer Q0 is not used itself. The encoding-decoding functions are
defined as in the previous section 5.1.
5.3 Performance comparison
We compare the two constructions proposed above, 7-hexagonal tiling figure 5, and 6-hexagonal tiling figure 6, in
terms of robustness, min-entropy of the key and entropy loss with the scalar quantization scheme introduced by
Linnartz et al. [11] on each dimension separately (we will refer to this as 4-square tiling).
To perform the comparison we consider identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) Gaussian sources. We as-
sume the background distribution PU2 to have mean (0, 0) and standard deviation σU2 . Without loss of generality
we assume that for any random X ∈ U2, the probability distribution of Px has mean X and standard deviation σ2x.
This model comes from our application area of biometrics, where the background distribution (also called imposter)
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describes all users, and the user distribution describes the user we are focusing on.
To evaluate the robustness to noise we compute probabilities associated to equal area decision regions, with the
reconstruction point centered in the mean X of distribution Px. The curves in figure 7 where obtained by progres-
sively increasing the area of the decision regions. The size of decision region is controlled by the scaling factor
of the lattice, q. The best performance is obtained by the hexagonal decision regions. This is because the regular
hexagon best approximates a circle, the optimal geometrical form for a spherical symmetrical distribution. How-
ever, differences between robustness of the three QIM cs-fuzzy extractor are not spectacular.
We measure the min-entropy of the key by calculating the min-entropy given the background distribution. The
min-entropy associated to the key distribution is compared in figure 8 among 7-hexagonal tiling, 6-hexagonal tiling
and 4-square tiling. Maximizing the min-entropy means minimizing the probability for an attacker to guess the key
correctly on her first try. The min-entropy of the 7-hexagonal tiling decreases rapidly with the increase of the lattice
scaling factor q relative to σU2 . While for a small lattice scaling factor q one can approximate the background distri-
bution as uniform, with the increase in scaling the center hexagon has a substantially higher probability associated
and thus one key value is more likely then the others. The 6-hexagonal tiling construction eliminates the middle
hexagon and as a result all key become equiprobable, at the cost of a somewhat lower robustness.
Finally, we evaluate the entropy loss for the key when publishing the sketch for the three constructions compared are
shown in figure 9 The values are scaled to the number of bits lost from each bit that is made public. The results are
somewhat surprising in the sense that the 4-square quantization looses more bits compared to our two constructions.
The reason is that while the sketch size is equal, thus all lose the same amount of information the min-entropy from
which count the loss is different.
6 Conclusions
We use QIM to construct the encoding and decoding functions of a cs-fuzzy extractor . This construction allows an
intuitive insight on the tradeoffs between the parameters of a cs-fuzzy extractor . We describe the key length-entropy
loss tradeoff as a simultaneous sphere-packing sphere-covering problem and we show that quantizing dimensions
in pairs gives the highest key length. We give two explicit two-dimensional constructions, which perform better
then the existing stacked one-dimensional 4-square tiling in terms of key length. We show that 6-hexagonal tiling
realizes the optimal two dimensional quantization. Using the 6-hexagonal construction we obtain n× ( log26
2
− 1)
more bits compared to the 4-tiling scheme.
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